ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The notions of uncoercibilety and receipt-freeness were first introduced by Benaloh and Tuinstra [1] to deal with vote-selling and coercing in electronic voting systems. They pointed out that, all the prior cryptographic electronic voting schemes were suffering from one common deficiency: the voters were allowed to encrypt their votes, but at the same time they were allowed to carry the receipt of their vote cast, which could be exploited to prove to a third party that a particular vote had been caste. This simple defect enables some serious problems like vote selling and coercing. The problem was further studied in different electronic election literatures [2, 3, 14] and also in electronic sealed-bid auction literatures [4, 5, 13, 14, 16] . In this paper auction means sealed bid auction. The problem of vote-selling or bid-selling occurs when the voters/bidders are the adversary. A group of voters/bidders make a conspiracy and commit to cast their vote/bid to a certain value as decided by the colluded voters/bidders. This type of collusion is called a ring [14] . Generally secrecy and privacy is maintained in any voting/auctioning system. Therefore the votes/bids are generally in encrypted form. The voters/bidders have to prove their cast/bid to the ring to convince the other colluded members that he has not broken the collusion. The traditional election system discourages vote selling because of the voting booth. The voter promises to the ring to cast his vote in favour of a particular party, but within the privacy of the voting booth, he may cast the opposite vote without bring afraid of any further consequence. As the voting process does not issue any receipt/acknowledgment of the vote cast; there is no question of proving the private value (caste vote) to any third party, even the voter wants to (e.g. for exchange of bride). Similar protection is there for sealed-bid auction, where the bids are submitted in the sealed envelope and no receipts are issued. On the other hand, coercing is the problem where the adversary influences/threatens the voters/bides to cast a particular value. This is known as rigging. Due to the physical existence of booth, coercer is not able to control the voters during their vote casting. However, electronic mechanism does not provide such protection and coercing is possible. In fact coercing is a form a rigging and electronic voting or auction suffers from rigging in two different forms:
1. Rigging before casting: the candidates are rigged to cast their vote or bid as directed by the coercer. 2. Rigging after casting: the candidates are rigged to produce a proof of their casting to the coercer so that the coercer could verify whether they obey his order or not.
To overcome the rigging, different approaches were proposed. Multiple authority model with threshold-encryption [4, 5, 16] was used to overcome the collusion of the authorities. Generally, the secret value of the cast/bid was shared among the authorities in such a way that a subsequent number of authorities can reconstruct the secret. It was assumed that the adversary cannot collude the subsequent number of authorities. Whereas the problem of eavesdropping was overcame with the assumption of untappable channel. Untappable channel is a physical assumption, such that the adversary cannot eavesdrop the communication. This can be achieved either by dedicated private link or by peer to peer fiber link, which may not be feasible for many applications. The implementation of secure electronic election/auction has seemed to be difficult with the two physical assumptions: virtual booth and untappable channel. This paper presents an alternative of the untappable channel. We propose a deniable encryption scheme using the public key, which may be used as a replacement of untappable channel. Our technique is well suited for electronic election and auction system. Deniable encryption was introduced by Canetti et.al. [17] . Deniable encryption allows an encrypted message to be decrypted to different sensible plaintexts, depending on the key used, or otherwise makes it impossible to prove the existence of the real message without the proper encryption key. This allows the sender to have plausible deniability if compelled to give up his or her encryption key.
Related works
The receipt-free incoercible protocols in [2, 5, 13, 14, 16] were based on two physical assumptions: bulletin/bidding booth and untappable channel. It is understood that without the untappable channel, uncoercibility can not be guaranteed. However, implementing the untappable channel might not be an easy task. In some literature [20, 21] tamper resistant smartcard were used to overcome the sender side coercing. The smartcard was used to generate the random inputs independently to encrypt the candidates' private values. The candidates had no control over the randomness nor were they informed about the value of the randomness. Therefore, coercing at the sender side did not make any sense. However, the scheme is suitable for large scale election/auction mechanism and requires an infrastructure and deployment policy for smartcard distribution. The smartcard based systems restrict the unregistered candidates (those who were not having smartcards) to participate in the voting/auctioning. This may be applicable in large scale election, but not suitable for auctioning, where any bidder can participate in the process either pre-registered or un-registered. Further the untapability assumption has not been completely removed in [20] . Here the "channel" between the Voter and the Encryption Blackbox is still assumed to be untappable. This is because if the message is tapped even before it is encrypted in the Encryption Blackbox, the plaintext is revealed. A new approach of anonymous electronic voting was proposed in [24] . It described a Generic Blind Signature Scheme with Dual Randomization to achieve uncoercibility and anonymity in electronic voting systems. However, since it involves registration of all users so it cannot be used in the Electronic auction mechanisms where users are allowed to bid even if they are registered or not.
The present paper presents a deniable encryption scheme as an alternative of the untappable channel. [19] . The scheme is unplanned-deniable and is not secure as plan-ahead-deniable unless the coercer has no control on the sender's local randomness. It is also inefficient and difficult to fit in the election/auction protocol. In [22] , a sender-side deniable encryption scheme was introduced, based on the intractability assumption of the Quadratic Residuosity Problem [18] . The scheme used onetime-padding technique to encrypt a message. The resultant cipher was two tuples ( , ), c A where c represented the padded message and A was a finite set of random elements * n a ∈ Z (n is the product of two distinct large primes) that represented a random string * {0,1} r ⊂ which was used in one-time-padding process. The receiver could reconstruct the string r with negligible error probability. In case of coercing, the sender could decode the random set A to some other string f r and could conveniently disclose a different message f m to prove that encryption of f m and f r resulted to the same cipher c.
The following is organized as follows: Section II describes the general methodology used in electronic voting and auctioning system, the method of coercing and the general techniques used to overcome the coercion. Section III describes the requirement of untappable channel to achieve the uncoerciveness and how deniable encryption can be used to replace the untappable channel. We present the technique to use deniable encryption with the existing protocols used in electronic voting and auctioning system.
ELECTRONIC CASTING SYSTEM AND COERCIVENESS
The general electronic casting systems consist of the following entities:
• A set of valid candidates, generally voters or bidders.
• The authorities of the casting system like vote counting machine of tallying machine.
• The adversary (coercer) may be a valid voter or bidder or may be an authority.
• The systems have a published list of nominees/items and the defined rule of the game (e.g. single candidate winning, the highest price winning auction).
The systems have the essential three phases:
• Casting: The candidates encrypt their private values with the authorities' public keys and the randomness to form conceals votes/bids and sends to the authorities.
• Opening: The authorities co-operate to open the encrypted casts.
• Tallying: After opening, the result has to be declared. The election protocol determines the winning nominee, not discloses the votes of the individuals. Whereas, the auction protocol determines the winning price, not the winner. The winner has to claim his victory with sufficient proof.
The coercer is the adversary in the system who wants to find the private values of some selected candidates. The coercer does the following:
• May coerces the candidates before or after their casting. Balloting/Bidding booth does not allow the coercing during the casting.
• Eavesdrop the communication link between the candidates and the authorities.
• Conspires with a set of colluded authorities. It is assumed that the coercer can not collude more then a certain number of authority. The candidates must reveal any information if they are coerced. However, the candidates may plausibly deny or produce false information (fake message), provided that the coercer cannot verify the deniability or falseness.
How to get Uncoerciveness
Uncoerciveness can be achieved based on the three premises: booth, untappable channel, receipt-freeness. The existence of booth allows the candidates to cast their private values without being observed by the coercer [1, 3] . This allows the candidates to make promises to the adversary (coercer), buy within the privacy of the booth they can break the promises without being identified.
As the coercer cannot control the candidates during their casting, he taps the communication channel and acquires the encrypted values and coerces by forcing the candidates to revile their randomnesses and plaintexts and verifies whether the ciphers are the encryption of the plaintexts. All the prior electronic election and auctioning schemes ensure uncoerciveness based on the assumption of a physical untappable channel between the booths and the authorities. The untappable channel disallows the coercer to tap the communication and hence guaranties uncoerciveness.
The only way to coerce the candidates is to acquire the encrypted values from the colluded authorities. To overcome the problem of authorities collusion, receipt-free threshold encryption and anonymous voting/bidding scheme is used. Anonymous casting hides the candidates identity from their cast in such a way that the identity can be extracted in case of repudiation. any protocols use mixnet [6] [7] [8] 15 ] to get anonymous submission. With receiptfreeness the candidates should not be able to convince a third party of the values of their cast nor the coercer can demand the proof of the candidates' private cast values. A homomorphic public key encryption with randomness is used to get receiptfreeness [2, 5, 13, 16, 14] . The private key is shared among the authorities such that a certain number of authorities has to cooperate to decrypt ciphers [4, 5, 16] . Thus a threshold encryption [9] [10] [11] is used to overcome the collusion of the authorities.
UNTAPPABLE CHANNEL AND DENIABLE ENCRYPTION
The existence of untappable channel is essential to get uncoerciveness in electronic election and auction systems. However, untappable channel is difficult to achieve. Here we present a deniable encryption scheme as an alternative of the untappable channel. Let M is message set and M ⊂ M is the set of all sensible plaintexts. Any m ∈ M is called valid message and M is the set of all valid messages. Generally the cardinality of the valid message set |M| is comparatively smaller then the cardinality of the message space | M |. Let E is an probabilistic deniable encryption process that encrypts a message m with randomness r. If c = E(m, r) is a cipher of a valid message m ∈ M and r is the randomness, then the plausible deniability allows the sender to find different plaintexts f m M ∈ and different randomness r f easily such that the encryption E(m f , r f ) results to the same cipher c. The m f and r f is called the fake message and fake randomness respectively. It is obvious that the fake message should be the member of the valid message set so that the sender can easily convince the third party with the fake message by concealing the true message m. Thus deniable encryption does not restrict the coercer to eavesdrop the communication, but if the coercer enforces the candidates to reveal the plaintexts and the randomness for their corresponding ciphers, they can easily find fake messages and fake randomness whose encryption looks like the same ciphers. Thus the candidates can confidently make a lie to the coercer without being afraid of being caught. Hence, eavesdropping does not provide any advantage to the coercer.
A. Prelimineries
The deniable encryption scheme proposed in this paper is based on the quadratic residue of a composite n, which is a product of two distinct primes. An integer a є * n Z is a quadratic residue modulo n, if there exists some x є * n Z such that a ≡ x 2 mod n. We denote a є n Q . Otherwise a is quadratic nonresidue modulo n and denoted as a є n Q .
The properties of quadratic residues of composite:
Let n ≥ 3 be odd number, the Jacobi symbol a n
For n being a product of two large primes, given an element a є Let n ≥ 3 be an odd composite number, n + J is the set of all pseudosquares and defined as
J is the set of all quadratic nonresidues and defined as n
Let n be a product of two distinct primes. Then half of the elements in n + J are quadratic residues and the other half are quadratic nonresidues. That is, if a є n + J , then the probability of a є n Q is 1 2 .
B. Properties of Sender-Side Deniable Encryption Protocol
The sender-side deniable encryption mechanism: A public-key encryption mechanism π is a sender-side deniable encryption if the following properties hold. 1. Correctness: The probability of the receiver's decryption differing from the sender's original message is negligible. 
A Deniable Encryption Scheme
In [22] a sender-side deniable encryption scheme was proposed. Let n is a product of two distinct large primes (p and q) of equal size. The receiver's public key is n and the private key is 
But without knowing the value of p and q it is hard to compute the inverse of d.
Deniable Encryption by Sender
One-time-padding is used as the encryption procedure. Let m is the message and r is a random string, the encrypted message is c m r = ⊕ . The sender computes the cipher as a two tuple (c,A). The tuple A is a representation of r, such that, the receiver can decode the random string r from A with negligible error probability. Whereas, if the sender is coerced, sender can easily construct a different fake random string r f for A and produce a fake message m f to prove that the cipher c is the encryption of m f and r f . The tuple A is a k × t matrix of elements from J n + and constructed as follows: The i th row of the A matrix is 
A Valid Message Deniable Encryption Scheme
The scheme allows the sender to deny a true message m by producing the fake message m f and the fake randomness r f . But the fake message m f is a function of the fake random string r f , (that is, m f = c ⊕ r f ). As the valid message set M in electronic election and auction are comparatively very small related to the message space M, the probability of m f ∈ M is very less. That is, if the sender randomly flips some bits of r to form r f , then there may be very less possibility that m f will be a valid message. So the sender has to determine the possible fake messages beforehand and then generates the random string r in such a way that he can produce the corresponding fake random strings r f easily for which the encryption of m f and r f results to the cipher c. 
Implementation Constraints
Consider an election/auction protocol with the valid message set M. Let m 1 ,m 2 є M and m 1 is the true message and during dishonest opening, the sender would produce the fake message as m 2 .
Sender But at the same time, according to the basic principle of the deniable encryption the string r must be a random string. So the sender cannot compute a string r which does not seem to be random (the distribution of 0s and 1s must be random). To ensure the above, we define a random mapping I :M I , where I is called an indexing of the valid message m to an indexed message . The mapping I should follow the following properties:
1. All the indexed message є I are equal in size 2. All the indexed messages must be theoretically random 3. For any two indexed messages 1 , 2 є I, the message difference contain less numbers of 1s. Now the sender computes the random string r properly. Sender generates a string r randomly and computes the randomness for one-time-padding as 
Existing Schemes without Untappable Channel
The existing election [2, 3, 14] and auction [5, 13, 16] schemes use encryption with randomness to secure the votes/bids form adversary. The encryption process produces the cipher which are random string over C, called cipher space. The cipher space C is sufficiently big and the ciphers are generally equal in size. But the bit differences among any two ciphers is also a random element in C. So, any pre-encryption mechanism results a random element over a sufficiently big set C which satisfy the first two properties of I function described in the previous section. However, the relaxation of the third property may not overcome the coercion by multiple coercions. Fig 1 shows a simulation result for the estimation of the message difference string, where pre-encryption is used before the deniable encryption scheme. We vary the cipher space C from 128-bits to 1024-bits strings and calculate the number of 1s in the message-difference string for any randomly selected two ciphers from the cipher space C. The result shows that the distribution of 1s in the message-difference string are random and the count of occurrence of 1s are approximately half of the size of the ciphers.
To plausibly deny a true message m, the candidate first determines the fake message 
Cipher and Key Size in Deniable Encryption
The ciphers of the deniable encryption are relatively bigger then the plaintexts. Generally the pre-encryption proposed in different literatures [2, 3, 14] and [5, 13, 16] are mapping from M C, where C = p Z , p is large prime, then the plaintexts for the deniable encryption are log 2 p bits.
Deniable encryption encrypts each bits of the plaintext to t random number in * n Z , where the A matrix in the cipher has t columns. So the number of bits in the cipher are t × log 2 p × log 2 n.
Modern mainstay ciphersystems do not offer deniability because they all use a small key. If the key is as large as the message it may offer total deniability meaning that any plaintext the size of the ciphertext may be fitted with a proper key. For shorter keys the deniability is more limited. Hence modern ciphersystems where the key can grow in size without imposing a computational penalty do offer deniability. In the deniable encryption scheme proposed in this paper, the plaintext having log 2 p bits are expanded to t × log 2 p × log 2 n bits in the ciphertext. Thus substantial deniability is achieved without incurring subsequent computational penalty. Modern deniable encryption techniques exploit the pseudorandom permutation properties of existing block ciphers, making it cryptographically infeasible to prove that the ciphertext is not in fact random padding data generated by a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator. 
DENIABILITY AND ANONYMITY
The deniable encryption mechanism described in this paper is used to overcome the coercing problem at the voter/bidder side. The situation would be worst if there are some authorities (vote tallying authority/auctioneer) who are colluded. The coercer may collect the encrypted votes/bids form the colluded authorities and will coerce the candidates. Neither the untappable channel nor the deniable encryption mechanism can prevent the coercer to coerce the candidates. To protect the candidates from coercing, in presence of colluded authorities, anonymous casting is proposed in different literatures [27] . Anonymity can be achieved by mixnet [25, 26] . Mixnet is the technique that uses cryptography and permutation to provide anonymity. A mixnet consists of sequence of server called mixes, each server receives a batch of input message and produces as output in a batch in permuted (mixed) order with a change of the appearance of the batch. The change of appearance and the random reordering of batch provide untracebility between the output batch and the input batches.
The deniable encryption mechanism can be redesign to provide a deniable mixnet between the candidates and the authorities. In that case, the private key of the deniable encryption would be shared among the mixnet servers. The authorities will receive the anonymous encrypted private values from the candidates. It the coercer is provided the anonymous encrypted bids, he will not able to find the candidates to whom the encrypted bid belongs to; hence coercing is not feasible.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented a technique that would replace the untappable channel used in election and auction protocol by deniable encryption. The adversary is allowed to tap the communication but if the adversary coerces the sender, then the sender can easily convince the coercer with a fake message that the cipher is the encryption of the fake message by concealing the true message. The deniable encryption scheme does not require any infrastructure and easy to deploy. The prior protocols which are based on public key cryptography and assume the existence of untappable channel are easily upgraded to a protocol without untappable channel without changing the basic encryption principle. However, deniable encryption has an expansion of the cipher size. Since, it does not use receipts and concepts of registration, so it can be effectively deployed in electronic auction mechanisms and is more secure as it does not assume untappable channels.
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